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In March and June 2017 protesters took 
to the streets of several dozen Russian 
cities. Russia has recently been the 
subject of lively discussion in political 
circles and the media for the most part 
because of its aggressive international 
politics and alleged meddling in the US 
elections.  
 
The recent demonstrations have forced 
analysts and journalists to look at the 
country from yet another perspective. 
Many have noticed a generational 
change in the demonstrations. Led by 
Alexei Navalny, the most recognizable 
opposition leader in Russia, young 
Russians took to the streets to protest 
corruption and demand change.  
 
However, the young people who 
decided to take part in the protests in 
March and June and others who showed 
their support for the protesters 
constitute only a very small fraction of 
young Russians. Opinion research 
indicates that the current regime in 
Russia has strong support among 
people ages aged 25 and younger, much 
stronger than among the older 
generations.  
 
This does not mean, however, that 
Navalny’s fight for the young is 
hopeless. It once again turns out that 
youth is unpredictable, and that in the 
case of Russia, a very thin line divides 
the support for Putin’s administration, 
on one hand, and the desire for deep 
changes and new political opening on 
the other.    
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Attack its weak point  
The direct cause of the protests was the 
documentary film, “He is not a Dimon to 
you,” which revealed the extent of Russian 
Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev’s 
affluence and corruption.1 The movie was 
produced by the Anti-corruption 
Foundation, an organization associated 
with Alexei Navalny, a main opposition 
figure in Russia. The rallies that were held 
on March 12 were organized to first and 
foremost criticize and stigmatize the all-
encompassing corruption among the 
political elites. Thousands of people took to 
the streets of more than eighty Russian 
cities.2 More than 10,000 people protested 
in Moscow, around 8,000 in Saint 
Petersburg, and from a few hundred to two 
thousand in other cities of Russia.3 A 
thousand protesters were detained by the 
police in Moscow alone.4 The March events 
saw a continuation on June 12 at rallies 
organized during the Day of Russia 
national holiday. Alexei Navalny, the main 
organizer of the protest, was detained by 
police in his courtyard, but that didn’t stop 
the rallies from taking place. “Stop 
corruption in Russia!” and “Hold politicians 
responsible!” were the protesters’ main 
slogans in approximately 140 Russian 
cities.5 Between 10,000 and 20,000 
protested in Moscow, 10,000 in Saint 
Petersburg and 3,000-5,000 in 
Novosybirsk, Yekaterynburg and 
Chelyabinsk. In Moscow alone, the police 
detained more than a few hundred people.6  
 
                                               
1 In the documentary, Dmitry Medvedev was accused of 
embezzling an estimated $1.2 billion, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MmCnHqwkyt0 ; 
https://fbk.info/english/press-releases/post/303/  
2 L. Jasina, A. Legucka, Konsekwencje protestów 
antykorupcyjnych dla kampanii wyborczej w Rosji, 
5.05.2017, http://www.pism.pl/publikacje/biuletyn/nr-43-
1485, access (10.08.2017). 
3 J. Strzelecki, I. Wiśniewska, M. Menkiszak, 
Antyrządowe protesty w Rosji, 27.03.2017,  
https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2017-03-
27/antyrzadowe-protesty-w-rosji, access: 10.08.2017. 
4 A. Kolesnikov, New Protests Question Russia’s Social 
Contract, 16.06.2017, 
http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/71283, access: 
10.08.2017. 
5 J. Strzelecki, I. Wiśniewska, M. Menkiszak, 
Antyrządowe protesty… 
6 A. Kolesnikov, New Protests Question… 
Corruption was the buzzword of the rallies. 
Indeed, the protests from March and June 
were fueled by anger towards the corrupt 
elites, especially Dmitry Medvedev, the 
former president of Russia, who had once 
been seen as offering hope for liberal 
reforms in Russia. The protesters 
demanded reforms. Although they were on 
a smaller scale than the events from 2011 
and 2012,7 they attracted serious interest 
both in Russia and abroad. These events 
are important for at least three reasons.   
 
First of all, contrary to the 2011-12 
demonstrations which had many 
organizers, the protests in 2017 were seen 
as a “one-man show.” The key figure 
behind the protest was Alexei Navalny, the 
politician and anti-corruption activist who 
had already risen to the position of the 
most recognizable figure of the opposition 
in Russia and is now re-iterating his 
leadership role. 
 
The second reason is the scale of the 
events. The protests took place in several 
dozen cities throughout Russia. Not only 
did they spread out beyond the traditional 
centers of protests, namely Moscow and 
Saint Petersburg, but the number of cities 
was comparable to, if not more than it was 
during the protests of 2011 and 2012. 
The third reason, which will be discussed in 
detail in this report, is the demography of 
the protest. What surprised many 
Russians, and the international community 
as well, was the engagement of young 
people (up to 24-25 years old) in the 
protest. Direct witnesses and photographic 
relations confirm the unusually high 
participation of young people (seen as a 
percentage of all protesters) who took part 
in the events. Young people came to the 
protests inspired by Alexei Navalny’s anti-
corruption campaign and to speak out 
about other issues important for them.  
                                               
7 The protests in 2011 and 2012 were motivated by claims 
that the parliamentary and presidential election results 
were flawed. They later evolved into anti-Putin and anti-
regime demonstrations. The consequences of the 
demonstrations were severe – many people ended up in 
prison, and the regime introduced a series of anti-
democratic laws.   
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The young Russian paradox – 
supporting the regime yet open to 
change 
 
It may come as a surprise that youth were 
a vital part of the protests in March and 
June when one looks at the data from 
opinion polling that show that young people 
are more likely to favor the current political 
regime than older Russians. 
 
Data from an opinion poll conducted by the 
Levada Center show that young Russians 
aged 18- 24 put more trust in the country’s 
main political figures and institutions than 
older Russians.  
 
 
Exceptional support for President Putin 
(87% among young Russians)8  
is supplemented by high approval of the 
                                               
8 Polls showing an extremely high approval of Putin are 
sometimes questioned. Some claim that merely asking 
questions about one’s support for Putin is, in  
an authoritarian state like Russia, questionable, because 
people are too afraid to say what they really think about 
him. At the same time, others tend to claim that the high 
approval of the president is not constant, and that it has 
even changed radically in the past. For instance, after 
2008, Putin lost one-third of his supporters. For these 
people, such a significant change shows that even if some 
people are afraid to express dissatisfaction, there are 
enough of them to have a significant impact on polls. 
What is also often stressed by the defenders of such 
surveys is that the Kremlin has created this high support 
for Putin because it uses powerful tools to influence 
society’s perceptions – namely, propaganda in national 
outlets.  
 
work of the government (66%), Parliament 
(60%) and Prime Minister Medvedev 
(57%). Positive perceptions of these 
institutions are consistently much stronger 
than negative attitudes towards them. 
These results are much different from 
those among Russians who are 25 and 
older. Here, the disapproval rates of the 
State Duma, Prime Minister Medvedev and 
the government are higher than the positive 
opinions of them. In the case of the State 
Duma, the negative difference reaches 20 
percentage points.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Young Russians not only have a better 
opinion of the political institutions in the 
country, they also see the situation of the 
state in rosier colors than the older 
generation does. Two-thirds of Russians 
aged 18-24 believe that the situation in 
Russia is going in the right direction, while 
almost one-fifth (19%) think the opposite. 
At the same time, among people 25 and 
older, a positive vision of the future is 
shared by 54%, and almost one-third (31%) 
worry that the situation is going into wrong 
direction (diagram 2).  
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The shift from general questions about the 
authorities and the situation in the country 
to more specific questions about protests 
and the politics of Alexei Navalny reveals  
an interesting trend. Although young 
Russians are more supportive of the 
current regime than the older generations, 
the potential for political and social protest 
is at pretty much the same (rather low) 
level and varies from 12% (readiness to 
participate in 
political protests by 
the general 
population) to 15% 
(participation in 
socially-oriented 
protests) for both 
youth and people 
who are 25 and 
older (diagram 3). 
 
Moreover, it seems 
that young people 
tend to be relatively 
more open to 
alternative 
“scenarios” for the 
future of the 
country. When 
asked about the desired future shape of 
their country, 49% responded that they 
would like Russia to be like the western 
developed countries.9 
 
Young Russians are more willing to believe 
that Navalny may be a real alternative for 
Russia. They are more enthusiastic about 
the new opposition leader than the older 
generations. As Levada research shows, 
25% of young people and 15% of their 
elders take a positive approach toward 
                                               
9 О молодежи старой и новой, 23.05.2017, 
https://www.levada.ru/2017/05/23/o-molodezhi-staroj-i-
novoj/, access: 10.08.2017. 
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Navalny.10 Respectively, 17% and less 
than 10% declare their willingness to vote 
for Navalny in the presidential elections.11 
When asked about Alexei Navalny’s activity 
as an anti-corruption activist, both young 
Russians (31%) and people aged 25 and 
older (27%) who know of him see his 
actions primarily as a preparation for the 
presidential election campaign. There is 
also a considerable group of people 
(around one-fifth among both young 
Russians and the older generations) that 
perceive Navalny’s actions as yet another 
representation of the current ruling elite.  
 
 
What distinguishes Russians aged 18-24 
from older people is the fact that youth 
more often claim that Alexei Navalny 
represents the interests of Russia than the 
West (20%, as opposed to 15%). The 
situation is the opposite among people 25 
and older – almost one-third (31%) believe 
that Navalny represents the interests of the 
West and only 11% see him as 
representing the interests of Russia.  
This short analysis of the data can be seen 
as an attempt to show a bigger picture of 
                                               
10 This survey only included people who know who 
Navalny is; Чей это город?, 28.03.2017, 
https://www.levada.ru/2017/03/28/chej-eto-gorod/, access: 
10.08.2017. 
11 Ibidem. 
Russian society – a society where young 
people are more supportive for the current 
political regime but also open to something 
new in Russian politics, while the older 
generation seem to be more critical 
towards the ruling elite (but not to Putin 
himself) and at the same time less 
optimistic that anything might change in 
Russian politics, and especially that 
Navalny could be the leader of change.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Young protesters: educated, internet-
savvy and looking for change  
The analysis of opinion poll data shows 
that young Russians who are not happy 
with the current political regime and are 
ready to express their dissatisfaction 
through participation in protests are a 
minority among youth in Russia. But this 
minority has been trying to show, through 
their participation in the March and June 
protests, their readiness to be a vocal 
group in society. Young people were a 
significant part, if not the majority, of the 
total number of protesters.12 The limited 
                                               
12 According to some sources, youth constituted as much 
as even 70% of all protestors.  
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quantitative data are insufficient for a 
comprehensive picture of the typical young 
protester, but information gathered by 
analysts and journalists who have been 
researching March and June events and 
data from general opinion polls provide 
information that is useful in looking at the 
phenomenon of young protesters.  
When one looks at the composition of 
young protesters, it turns out that they 
represent middle class families, in many 
cases the so-called “intelligentsia.”13 
According to interviews conducted by the 
Levada Center, young Russians who 
participated in March protests are highly 
educated (students or would-be students). 
In many cases, they follow the example of 
their parents who also show up regularly at 
protests and talk about politics at home.14 
Another interesting factor is the potential 
openness to change among part of the 
young Russians, which also revealed in 
their attitudes towards the protests. It 
seems that young Russians, more often 
than older people, believe in the “honesty” 
and “good cause” of the protesters and the 
protests themselves. According to the 
Levada Center, 10% of people aged 18-24 
who were asked about the June protests 
said that people were paid to participate. 
Among the older generations, this 
response was chosen by 21%. Also, young 
Russians are harder to discourage if 
protests fail. As research by Levada shows, 
young people very often protest for 
protest’s sake – they have a need to 
express their emotions.15 Older people are 
more skeptical, and if protests are not 
successful, they more readily give up.      
                                                                     
День России: россиянам не позволено спорить с 
Путиным, 14.06.2017,   
https://www.inopressa.ru/article/14jun2017/inotheme/prot
ests_russia_obzor14.html, access: 10.08.2017. ; Леонид 
Радзиховский: Митинги протеста не имели никаких 
политических целейПодробнее:, 13.06.2017,     
https://ok-inform.ru/politics/domestic/94549-leonid-
radzikhovskij-mitingi-protesta-ne-imeli-nikakikh-
politicheskikh-tselej.html, access: 10.08.2017. 
13 В чем особенности новой волны протестов в 
России, 6.04.2017,  http://carnegie.ru/commentary/68576, 
access: 10.08.2017. 
14  В чем особенности… 
15 Чей это город… 
The young people who took to the streets 
in March and June – because of their social 
status and better education – are 
presumably more aware of their situation in 
the country than the general population. 
And this situation has seriously 
deteriorated since 2014.16 Average real 
incomes have been decreasing for three 
consecutive years.17 The enduring crisis 
with no sign of reforms offers young people 
little hope for change. Almost one-third 
(32%) would like to leave the country 
permanently.18 The general unhappiness 
with the economic situation has been 
magnified by the stark contrast between 
some representatives of the authorities 
living in luxury and the many people 
struggling in recent years. When Navalny 
released a documentary about Medvedev’s 
wealth, support for the prime minister 
among the young people fell by 10 
percentage points.19 
The social media factor should not be 
underestimated. Youth get their news from 
the internet more often than older people – 
70% of young Russians receive information 
about current events from online sources, 
compared to only 25% of Russians in 
general.20 On the internet, and especially in 
the social media, political activists 
(including Navalny) have an advantage 
over the state. For instance, Navalny’s 
Youtube channel has 1.3 million 
subscribers, whereas the Kremlin’s official 
channel has only 30,000.21 At the same 
time, television still plays an important role; 
60% of young people point to it as 
                                               
16 Average wages,  
https://data.oecd.org/earnwage/average-wages.htm, 
access: 10.08.2017. 
17 M. Menkiszak, Rosja odbiła się od dna, „Rocznik 
Strategiczny 2016/2017”, 2017. 
18 Emigratsiya_tabl, http://www.levada.ru/cp/wp-
content/uploads/2017/06/Emigratsiya_tabl..pdf, access: 
10.08.2017. 
19 In May, Medvedev's support started to grow again  
«Эффект от фильма «Он вам не Димон» почти 
прошел», 29.05.2017, 
https://www.levada.ru/2017/05/29/effekt-ot-filma-on-vam-
ne-dimon-pochti-proshel/, access: 10.08.2017. 
20 Ibidem. 
21https://www.youtube.com/user/NavalnyRu ;  
https://www.youtube.com/user/kremlin/featured   
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important source of information.22 While 
this means that many young people make 
use of diverse sources of information, one 
can assume that the young people who 
took part in the protests are those who are 
“online” and follow political discussions like 
those from Navalny’s channels on a more-
or-less regular basis or are at least 
exposed to people who follow these types 
of debates. Moreover, the internet is a 
source of various types of “triggers” that 
can influence young people and their 
readiness to openly protest because they 
are the ones who are the most exposed to 
these “triggers.” This includes memes 
(featuring both Navalny and regime 
politicians), blogs, vlogs (for instance, 
Youtuber Nikolay Sobolev, who 
encouraged youth to participate in the 
protests23) and other shared content, like 
the video showing a counter-productive 
lecture during which students were 
discouraged to take part in protests and 
were explained what “patriotism” is.24  
An interesting factor that also could have 
influenced young people is the fact that the 
young are less willing to accept the costs of 
Russia’s neo-imperial foreign policy (e.g., 
Russia’s engagement in Ukraine and 
Syria). More than half (55%) of young 
Russians do not support spending public 
money on Crimea development at the 
expense of social benefits.25 This could 
mean that young Russians are less 
susceptible to traditional propaganda 
schemes, which tend to dwell on nostalgia 
for the USSR period.26  
                                               
22 «Эффект от фильма «Он вам не Димон» почти 
прошел», 29.05.2017, 
https://www.levada.ru/2017/05/29/effekt-ot-filma-on-vam-
ne-dimon-pochti-proshel/, access: 10.08.2017. 
23 Generation YouTube: How Millennials Are Shaping 
Russian Politics, 19.04.2017, 
http://carnegie.ru/commentary/68709,  access: 10.08.2017. 
24 Почему на акции протеста вышло столько 
подростков?, 27.03.2017, 
https://meduza.io/feature/2017/03/27/pochemu-na-aktsii-
protesta-vyshlo-stolko-podrostkov-i-chego-oni-hotyat, 
access: 10.08.2017. 
25 R. Rahimov, Russia’s millennials challenge the 
Kremlin, 4.05.2017, 
http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/articles-and-
commentary/2345-russia-s-millennials-challenge-the-
kremlin, access: 10.08.2017. 
26  Ibidem  
With the young for the young? 
Alexei Navalny has been often labeled the 
number one opposition leader in Russia, 
and the Western media are keen to 
deliberate whether he may represent a 
serious alternative to the Russian political 
regime and president Putin personally 
anytime in the future. In Russia, Navalny 
continues to become more widely 
recognized and to raise emotions among 
society. Back in March 2012, only 25% of 
Russians had heard of Navalny, while five 
years later (March 2017), this figure 
doubled (to 55%).27 This is definitely not a 
coincidence. What Navalny and his team 
have created is a well-planned and 
decently executed strategy of political and 
social activism neatly connected with self-
promotion. They undertake actions such as 
investigating cases of corruption and 
publicizing them, organizing protests and 
offering legal aid for people detained at the 
protests.28 All these actions likely contribute 
to Navalny’s bigger goal – an effective 
electoral campaign. He still counts on the 
possibility that he will be allowed to take 
part in the upcoming presidential 
elections.29 That would give him access to 
national broadcasts, enabling him to reach 
a wider new audience. 
What also contributes to Navalny’s 
recognition is his involvement at the 
regional level. He travels across the 
country giving speeches and talking with 
citizens, thereby drawing the attention of 
people who would otherwise have never 
                                               
27 Акции протеста 26 марта и Навальный, 6.04.2017,  
https://www.levada.ru/2017/04/06/aktsii-protesta-26-
marta-i-navalnyj/, access: 10.08.2017. 
28 A. Arutunyan, Russia protests: this time it is different, 
29.03.2017, 
http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_four_ways_navaln
ys_protests_go_beyond_bolotnaya_7259, access: 
10.08.2017. 
29 Navalny has been found guilty regarding alleged fraud 
based on dubious investigations involving a timber 
company called Kirovles. In May 2017, a Russian court 
upheld a five-year suspended sentence for Navalny, which 
means that according to Russian legislation, he won’t be 
able to be a presidential candidate in the forthcoming 
elections. Navalny’s team hopes, however, that the 
Russian Central Electoral Commission will allow him to 
participate in the election because the Kremlin may 
calculate that blocking Navalny’s participation would be 
more risky than his participation in the elections.;  The 
man who would (…)   
NGOs and civil society in Belarus | page 8 
  
heard of him. Moreover, he has started to 
open regional election offices. Currently 
(August 2017), there are 70 offices all over 
the country and 134,000 people are 
engaged in his campaign.30 
Navalny’s name has been particularly 
associated with one group of people – 
young Russians. It seems that although 
general opinion data show that a majority 
of young people favor the current political 
regime, he is counting on his skills to 
effectively reach young people with his 
anti-corruption and anti-establishment 
agenda. And one can say that to some 
extent his strategy is working. He is not 
only surrounded by young volunteers who 
have been helping him to launch and carry 
out his activities in Russia’s regions and in 
the social media, but is apparently a “rising 
star” among young people who are looking 
for something new in Russian politics.  
There are several factors that contribute to 
Navalny’s high popularity among young 
Russians (as opposed to other age 
groups). A key factor is Navalny’s high 
visibility on the internet. Excluded from 
normal political debate in the public TV 
channels, Navalny has been forced to find 
his own platforms of communication to find 
an audience. He has gone online and has 
done it pretty effectively. Once an anti-
corruption blogger, he has now developed 
his internet activities to become a full-scale 
information provider. His famous 
documentary about the alleged illegal 
wealth of Dmitry Medvedev was posted 
online and has been watched by almost 25 
million people. In March 2017, Navalny’s 
team launched a new project named 
“Navalny live.” This Youtube channel 
provides its subscribers and other 
interested viewers with an array of talk 
shows on topics related to political and 
economic issues. Alexei Navalny is only 
one of the contributors, while other shows 
are hosted by his political compatriots.  
Navalny also knows how to reach young 
people who are online because he has 
natural skills (or effectively emulates them) 
                                               
30 https://2018.navalny.com/, access: 10.08.2017. 
in targeting young people by finding a 
“common language” with them. He knows 
how to communicate his vision of politics 
and Russia. He doesn’t beat about the 
bush when speaking about the corruption, 
lies and hypocrisy of the Russian elites and 
uses colorful, youth-oriented language. He 
presents himself as dynamic, modern and 
someone new in contrast to establishment 
politicians. He basically senses what is 
missing in Russian politics. But attracting 
youth is not only about language, it is also 
about the topics Navalny engages in, and it 
seems that the topic of the authorities’ 
corruption resonates with young people. 
Instead of criticizing the political elites in 
general, Navalny targets concrete people 
(like Medvedev) with very precise and well-
documented allegations. This allows young 
Russians to see real (tangible) problems 
and not only a general picture of the “bad 
elites.”  
The economic program that Navalny’s 
team is pursuing during the pre-election 
period is tailored for people with a liberal 
approach towards the economy. Apart from 
the promise to fight the omnipresent 
corruption, the program promotes a limited 
role of state in the economy and lower 
social benefits. This liberal program may 
appeal to younger rather than older 
people’s expectations. According to the 
Levada Center, only 27% of young people 
declared that they could not live without 
state assistance, while among the older 
generations, the declared necessity for 
state support was as high as 70%.31 
On the other hand, Navalny has not built 
his image as a reflection of a western 
liberal democrat in Russia. When it comes 
to social rights, Navalny seems to be 
searching for his own way (or pretending to 
do so), and this just may work in the case 
of young Russians, since many of them 
don’t identify with western democratic 
values entirely, but rather are looking for 
something in between western liberalism 
and Russian conservatism. 
                                               
31 Pokolenie terpimych i niezawisimych, 20.06.2017, 
https://www.levada.ru/2017/06/20/pokolenie-terpimyh-i-
nezavisimyh/, access: 10.08.2017. 
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Finally, Navalny, as has been already 
mentioned, surrounds himself with young 
people – people in their 20s and 30s 
constitute a majority of his team. The 
process of broadening the scope of 
Navalny’s activities through more 
involvement and presence in the regions of 
Russia has been possible thanks to the 
substantial involvement of young Russians. 
Navalny’s team has so far opened around 
70 regional offices, and more than one-
third of them are led by people who are not 
older than 30.32 The youngest person 
among the coordinators is only 19 years 
old. These people are responsible for 
developing the regional structures of 
Navalny’s movement and recruiting new 
activists. This means that as Navalny 
manages to build up a team of young 
activists and volunteers, his ability to reach 
out to other young Russians significantly 
increases. One can assume that one of the 
most effective ways to reach the younger 
generation is to use the potential of people 
their age who already believe in Navalny’s 
leadership and vision of Russia and know 
what arguments and language to use to 
increase the number of supporters and 
potential voters for Navalny.  
The future remains unclear  
The current protests in Russia are certainly  
worth a closer look, but one should be 
cautious as regards assessing their 
significance for possible political changes 
in Russia. Although young people were 
more visible at the demonstrations than 
ever before, this should not overshadow 
the fact that those who engaged in the 
protests constituted a small minority of 
Russian youth. People aged 25 and 
younger are fervent supporters of the ruling 
regime and are more likely to believe in a 
bright future for their country under the 
current political elites than the older 
generations. It is interesting to note that in 
the case of young people, their high 
support for the regime overlaps with their 
readiness to embrace change and their 
hopes for a new opening in Russian 
politics, a readiness which is less common 
                                               
32 https://2018.navalny.com/, access: 10.08.2017. 
among the older generations. One might 
feel that while the older generations are 
less happy about the current political elites 
(President Putin excluded), they are also 
less willing to risk change, as it could turn 
out even worse than the current situation. 
On the other hand, young people appear to 
be much more optimistic about the future 
and have faith that changes will go in a 
positive direction.    
Alexei Navalny is someone who knows 
how to take advantage of the fact that 
some young people are looking for a new 
quality in Russian politics. By addressing 
specific topics, such as corruption among 
the authorities, and by using effective 
communication channels (youtube and 
other social media) to communicate these 
topics, Navalny has earned recognition 
among young people. His image as an 
effective leader – someone new in Russian 
politics – has allowed him to gather a team 
of activists and volunteers who are now 
operating in 70 cities of Russia. This team, 
with its many young people, is aiming to 
achieve greater recognition and support for 
Navalny. One can guess that young people 
from the regions will be the most likely 
target of these actions.  
Amidst the deliberations on the recent 
protests, two questions remain particularly 
interesting, and neither of them have clear 
answers. The first one is the reaction of the 
Russian authorities to the rising popularity 
of Alexei Navalny. And this is not only a 
question of the potential to ruthlessly detain 
Navalny and block his candidacy in the 
presidential election, but also a more 
sophisticated reaction via internet 
platforms, especially through Youtube and 
social media. How is the current ruling 
regime going to use its resources – 
including its army of “internet trolls” – to 
reach young people and to discredit 
Navalny and his co-workers? Some actions 
have already been taken, for instance, the 
Russian parliament has made further 
attempts to put limits on internet activity on 
the internet (i.e., making it harder to access 
blocked websites).33 Also, a few weeks 
                                               
33 R. Rahimov, Russia’s millennials challenge…   
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after the march protest, a short video 
comparing Navalny to Adolf Hitler was 
published on Youtube.34 TV Rain 
(Телеканал Дождь) claims the video was 
produced by Agency One, by order of 
Kremlin.35  
It seems that despite these actions, for 
now, Navalny is one step ahead of the 
authorities.  
Another question is the future of the 
political opposition in Russia. How are they 
going to respond to the growing interest in 
politics among young Russians? It is 
Navalny and his team who at least in part 
created this situation, although they hope 
to use it for their own purposes. And for 
now, they are doing a pretty effective job, 
as Navalny’s recognition and popularity 
among young people in Russia is on the 
rise. So, one might ask to what extent are 
young people a target for other opposition 
figures and whether we can expect a battle 
over young people in the near future – a 
battle between Navalny and the authorities  
and a battle between Navalny and the 
other opposition leaders. 
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